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ABSTRACT 
The Egyptian government and its legislators have been putting forth legislative amendments to its 
domestic laws that are controversial in relation to investment, tenders, bids, and investment 
guarantee as top priority. On one hand, they are doing this in order to encourage and reassure the 
foreign investors in Egypt, and on the other hand, they are likely facing psychological fears of 
international massive litigations. However, these legislative investment amendments could threaten 
and undermine the stability of inherited Egyptian jurisdiction systems and integrity. These 
amendments include providing avenues of escape of corruption and financial crimes through the 
reconciliations with the foreign investors who have been damaging the Egyptian economy and its 
citizens’ livelihoods. As the role, size, and impact of foreign investment grow worldwide. The 
mechanisms holding such entities accountable are actively diminishing. Unfortunately, the legal 
framework of foreign investment is aggressively shrinking the state’s role in regulating these 
foreign investment enterprises in Egypt, while challenging the very sovereignty and jurisdiction of 
the Egyptian court system to investigate allegations of violations committed by foreign investors. In 
effect, this results in absolute impunity by foreign investors in Egypt. Moreover, this trend of more 
legal privileges and the loose accountability to the foreign investors create a negative impact on 
Egyptian public interests and then on the Egyptian legal system as well as on the Egyptian 
Constitution. The aim of this paper, therefore, is to highlight the lawful deficiencies of the amended 
investment laws as well as its patterns trespass to the Egyptian Constitution. In addition, this paper 
brings out the implications of these violations on the inherited Egyptian legal system.  
© 2016 Pak Publishing Group. All Rights Reserved. 
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Contribution/ Originality 
This paper contributes to existing literature in two ways; first, it critically analyzed the 
presidential decrees that amended some part of the Egyptian laws. Secondly, the study also 
evaluates the effects of these legislative amendments on the Egyptian legal system.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Without doubt, the globalization of enterprises boosts economic growth and development, but 
also dominates the global trade system. As a result of this, national legal protections are 
appropriately put in place for globalization. Therefore, legislations that are the main instruments of 
determination and control over any hybrid economic and legal issues regulate the economy and 
point it towards liberalism, economic nationalism, and Marxist economics (Peinhardt and Allee, 
2012). 
Although domestic legal norms and bilateral treaties play a vital role in the global legal norms 
and practices, Lehavi (2014) argued that the conflicts between the norms and the treaties could 
change the formation of the legal structure of  nations. Therefore, the compromises and settlements 
of the legal conflicts over international investment activities can be legitimately resolved within the 
binding countries (Stiglitz, 2007).  
The following are the major profit and non-profit players that make organizations play divisive 
roles in economic globalization: A foreign direct investment (FDI) is the most prominent of forms 
of investment for this economic globalization. Conventionally, the obligations and constraints tied 
to international economic architecture are placed mainly by multinational corporations (MNCs) 
(Goldman, 2006) international financial institutions (IFIs), intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), and other global private sectors that associate closely with international trade and 
investment agreements. 
These major players have noticeable effect on the legal framework in many countries 
regulating foreign investment (Paparinskis, 2012). Where, the legislation is aggressively shrinking 
the state‟s role in controlling these enterprises that challenge the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the 
national court system in order to investigate allegations of violations committed by foreign 
investors. In effect, this global investment system leads to absolute impunity to the foreign 
investors in developing countries (Stiglitz, 2007).  
A fundamental purpose of investment treaties is to protect and promote investment. 
International investment treaties consist principally of three types :( 1) bilateral investment treaties, 
commonly known as 'BITs', (2) bilateral economic agreements with an investment provision, and 
(3). BITs, as the name indicates, exclusively govern investment relations between two signatory 
states (Markusen and Maskus, 2001); (Teece, 1986). The role of these Treaties is important to 
facilitate the transfer of intangible assets, such as the knowledge or reputation of an MNC across 
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borders. Despite this effort, the MNCs connive with the relevant government institutions so that 
policies are made to favor MNCs interests at the risk of national and public interest
1
.  
In the meantime, Egypt is one of the states facing the highest figure of cases requiring 
litigation in international investment courts and facing claims of more than USD 20 billion yearly 
from foreign investors
2
, because of the imbalanced bilateral investment treaties (BITs). 
Unfortunately, BITs between Egypt and developed countries seem to favor the interests of foreign 
investors at the expense of Egypt‟s state sovereignty and public interest. However, ironically, these 
BITs remain the pillar of Egypt‟s reform of the investment framework, especially the latest 
amendments that were passed by the current president of Egypt on the Eve of the Economic 
Conference in Egypt between 13 and 15 March 2015 (De Chazournes and Laurence, 2014). 
Egypt‟s legislative framework is very indicative of its vision for investment that is influenced 
by reflective global investment trends rather than being responsive to economic and social needs on 
the domestic level. It can be argued that the Egyptian legal approach of investment includes the 
following features: 
First, the Egyptian legal approach of investment is fully compliant with World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules, and BIT provisions. Where, Egypt is eager to attract foreign 
investments by diminishing the sovereignty for turning favor to these foreign investments that are 
practically allowed to draw their own business environment. However, there is increased presence 
of foreign investment, operating in developing and third-world countries. Where, economies 
continue to struggle with very low growth rates. The foreign investments have become a major 
player on this issue at the domestic level and they often violate the legal norms as well as practices 
of the Constitutional Heritage. The Egyptian constitution has always given to the national 
jurisdiction pride place, and evidently exercising lawful protection of domestic interest
3
. 
Second, Egypt has passed recent amendments of investment framework that align national 
laws with the remaining main provisions of bilateral investment treaties. The amendments have 
granted foreign investors large protections and incentives, with few regulations being allowed by 
the state, and they have denied the Egyptian judicial oversight over corruption and other economic 
crimes‟ cases. 
                                                             
1
 UNCTAD, IIA ISSUES NOTE RECENT TRENDS IN IIAS ISDS, No. 1 February 2015 database. Note: Preliminary data for 2014. 
Retrieved 11 October 2015 from unctad.org/en/.../webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf > accessed. See also, UNCTAD. World Investment Report 
(2012): Towards A New Generation of Investment Policies [REPORT]. UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION Sales No.E.12. II.D.3 ISBN 978-
92-1-112843-7 (Sales No.E.12. II.D.3 ISBN 978-92-1-112843-7), 204. Retrieved 9 October, 2015 from 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/WIR2012_WebFlyer.aspx>accessed. 
2 UNCTAD. Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS. (2015). [REPORT]. UNCTAD, 18 
3 The bids and tenders law is one of the most important texts used by Egyptian courts to annul privatization and land sale cont racts, since it 
regulates sales provisions and operations. Thus, reducing the cover of the law is a first step to lifting regulations on the sales public resources 
and property, which promises even more corruption.   
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Finally, the second feature triggers impunity for the cases of systematic and widespread 
corruptions in Egypt that continue to cost Egypt billions of dollars annually. The money could have 
been better spent on infrastructure development and provision of quality health services. 
Unfortunately, Egypt‟s current investment framework seems to help the interests of MNCs 
over the internal interests. The Egypt‟s legal approach to investment is reflective of the global 
trend, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO) that specified rules and accords. The 
Egyptian government‟s policies on these issues are influenced essentially by the legislative council. 
Therefore, one can only conclude that Egypt is allowing investors to breach domestic laws in order 
to attract foreign investments, without taking into account the public interest, the prestige of the 
national laws, and the domestic jurisdiction integrities. For example, Law No.4 of 2012, concerning 
the amendment of some provisions of the Investment Guarantees and Initiatives Law issued 
through Act No.8 of 1997, authorized the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) 
to settle cases of fraud, theft, and corruption in investment, from outside the criminal courts. This 
invalidated criminal proceeding against investors in all cases of fraud and took away the role of the 
judiciary in accountability for corruption, in an assault on the rule of law.  
It is in line with these that the paper aims to analyze the presidential decrees that amended 
some Egyptian investment laws. In addition, it evaluates the impact of these legislative 
amendments on the Egypt‟s legal system. 
 
1.1. Conceptual Clarification of Terms 
The Arab Republic of Egypt “is a sovereign, united and indivisible State. Egypt is a country 
with a democratic Republican system based on citizenship and the rule of law. Egyptians are part of 
the Arabic-speaking nations who are seeking enhancement for integration and unity. Egypt is also 
part of the Islamic world. It not only belongs to the African continent and cherishes its Asian 
dimension, but it also contributes to build human civilization” (Abdel, 2008).  
It is worth noting that the classical dichotomy of public and private law has resulted in the 
crystallization of a separate set of legal rules applicable to transactions involving the state (or any 
of its institutions, subsidiaries, or state-owned enterprises) acting as a sovereign power. This 
entailed the establishment of the Egyptian Council of State (Council of State) by virtue of Law No. 
112 of 1946 as amended by Law No. 9 of 1949, which consists of administrative courts vested with 
the power to decide over managerial disputes pertaining to administrative contracts and 
governmental decrees issued by government officials. These courts apply administrative rules, 
which are not entirely codified; hence, because often no applicable legislative rules exist, the scope 
of judicial discretion is ample in light of the established precedents laid by the supreme courts 
(Fahmy, 2015).  
The judicial authority acts as the third independent power of the state. The Egyptian Judiciary 
is comprised of secular and religious courts, administrative and non-administrative courts, the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, penal courts, civil and commercial courts, personal status and 
family courts, national-security courts, labor courts, and military courts, as well as other specialized 
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courts or circuits. The Egyptian court system is composed of a number of tiers: The Court of First 
Instance, the Court of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation are at the apex of the judiciary. The 
classical dichotomy of public and private law has resulted in the establishment of the Council of 
State, which consists of administrative courts vested with the power to decide over executive 
disputes pertaining to authoritative contracts and administrative decrees issued by government 
officials and ministries. The Supreme Constitutional Court has been established in 1970, replacing 
the Supreme Court that had been established in 1960, and has exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
issues regarding the constitutionality of laws and regulations, as well as negative and positive 
conflicts of jurisdiction. 
Egypt's economy depends mainly on agriculture, media, petroleum imports, natural gas, and 
tourism; there are also more than three million Egyptians working abroad, chiefly in Saudi Arabia, 
the Persian Gulf, and Europe.  Since 1991, Egypt has been implementing the policy of 
privatization, so the state is no longer the sole investor, and its role is based on the indicat ive 
planning and direct implementation of the necessary economic and social development, which is 
concentrated mainly in infrastructure projects of public investments. The current Egyptian 
economic strategy considers that the privatization policy of economy is a key component of 
economy‟s reform in Egypt. The Egypt's government depended on some mechanisms, which aimed 
at creating the Egyptian economy in the privatization. This economics conversion has been 
conducted through the restructuring of economic institutions, in order to restore the balance 
required in the basic economic variables. This economy‟s approach helped to open the door for the 
private sector to strengthen its involvement in the economy‟s activity and its policies.  
The ruling investment legislations in Egypt have been completely changed, when the Egyptian state 
determined to embrace economic openness and liberalization, the economy began to be liberalized 
in piecemeal legislation. The 1989 investment law and the 1991 public enterprise law 
foreshadowed the phase of general economic legislation. In the mid-1990s, the focus turned to 
extensive legislation that liberalized the economic infrastructure in several important sectors such 
as investment, export, banking, insurance, ports, and the stock market.   
Egyptian business laws: 
Investment Law No. 8 of 1997, Law No. 159 of 1981, Amendment to the Investment Law and 
Corporate Law, the Commercial Agency Law, Tax Law, Labor Law, Intellectual Property Rights 
Law, Environmental Law, The Commercial Register Law, Special Economic Zones Law, Land and 
Real Estate Ownership Law, Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law. 
Egyptian financial laws cover: 
Mortgage Law, Money Laundering Law, Insurance Law, General Budget Law, Central Securities 
Depository Law, and Capital Market Law. 
Egyptian trade laws encompass: 
Export Promotion Law, Customs Law, Anti-Dumping Law, Import and Export Regulation Law and 
Competition, and finally, Antitrust Law. 
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2. EGYPTIAN LEGISLATION AND THE PRIORITY 
As usual, the Egypt‟s legal approach is based on the main concepts of sustainable development 
to attract more local and foreign capital to the Egyptian economy (Nagarajan, 2013). Moreover, the 
best and most effective manner to encourage investment is to offer tremendous privileges for 
foreign investors. All these require legislative amendments in order to demonstrate the State's 
keenness for investment and investors. The successive post-2011 governments, including the 
current interim cabinet, still clutch for those failed attracting-investment policies. The Egyptian 
government continues to look into attracting foreign investments as the solution to all of the 
country‟s financial and economic problems, thus mechanisms to attract foreign investments have 
been given a top priority, and the Egyptian government with its economic policies is continuing to 
ignore available resources in Egypt and national solutions to complex economic and social 
problems, such as wages, housing, health, and education
4
. 
Factually, the government of Egypt has declared investment, including foreign investment, a 
top priority. It has supported this policy through a series of recent pro-business amendments, 
including a third-party-contract appeal law prohibiting third-party interference in state-investor 
contracts; a competition law; and a presidential decree reforming Egypt's 1997 Investment Law by 
trimming customs duties, expanding corporate veil protection, establishing additional forums for 
investor-state disputes, and setting the foundation for a true one-stop business registration shop. 
Additional upcoming reforms promised by the government include a value-added tax (VAT), 
simplified bankruptcy proceedings, a company's law, and amendments to the capital markets law, a 
new insurance law, and a land management framework. 
Moreover, the country has demonstrated a willingness to make difficult economic decisions, 
including cutting fuel subsidies by 30 percent and devaluing the Egyptian pound. In addition, in 
March 2015, the country organized the Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC), 
bringing together heads of state and multinational chief executives to showcase Egypt‟s reform 
agenda, spotlight USD 36 billion in foreign investments, and offer speeches by ministers who 
affirmed the government‟s commitment to economic reform.  
Egypt's government claims that it has several programs intended to attract foreign direct 
investment into special economic and trade zones. The General Authority for Investment and Free 
Zone (GAFI) implements Egypt‟s policies and procedures to facilitate doing business, including 
maintaining Egypt‟s “one-stop shop” for investors
5
. The Egyptian tax code taxes, personal income 
and corporate profits for both foreigners and nationals at a maximum marginal rate of 25 percent. 
The Minister of Finance recently declared that this rate will be reduced to 22.5 percent. In 2015, the 
World Bank‟s Ease of Doing Business Index ranked Egypt 112 out of 185 economies (Sherif, 
2015). The laws that reflect the Egyptian legal approach towards investment and their development 
are described in the next section. 
                                                             
4 Al-Jarida and Al-Rasmiyya, 1948. Law No. 131 of 1948 Civil Code, 108.  
5
 World Bank‟s doing Business Report “Ease of Doing Business”, doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
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2.1. The Review of Legislators’ Incentive Releases 
The Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 8 of 1997) was intended to motivate domestic and 
foreign investment in stressed economic sectors and to promote decentralization of industry away 
from the Nile Valley. The law permits 100 percent alien ownership of investment projects and 
warranties the right to remit revenue earned in the Egyptian state and to repatriate capital. Other 
basic provisions embrace guarantees against confiscation, sequestration, and expropriation; the 
right to acquire land; the right to preserve foreign-currency bank accounts; liberty from 




Law No. 94 of 2005 amended the law No.8 of 1997 and made corporations combined under its 
subject to quit simple procedures for the combination
7
. It also granted companies established under 
the Businesses Law or the Commercial Law sure incentives, including a shield from expropriation, 
the imposition of compulsory pricing, and termination or suspension of authorizations to use 
immovable possession such as the real estate, buildings and lands. It also granted firms the right to 
own real estate wanted for their business and the right to import raw materials, equipment, spare 
parts, and transportation means without being required to record them on the Importers List. 
The Companies Law No. 159 of 1981(Riad, 2000) applies to domestic and foreign investment 
in sectors not covered by the Investment Incentives Law, whether shareholder, joint stock, or 
limited liability companies, representative offices, or branch offices. The law allows automatic firm 
recording upon a submission to GAFI, with some exclusions. The law also removed a preceding 
legal condition that at least 49 percent of shareholders be Egyptian, allows 100 percent foreign 
representations on the board of directors, and supports accounting norms
8
. 
 Law No. 89 of 1998 (Tenders Law) requires the government to consider both price and best 
value in giving contracts and to release a clarification for rejection of a tender. But, the law 
includes favoritism for Egyptian national contractors, who are given priority if their bids do not 
exceed the lowest foreign bid by more than 15 percent. 
 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Capital Markets Law) and its amendments and regulations rule Egyptian 
capital markets. Foreign investment entities and investors can buy shares on Egypt's Stock 
Exchange on a similar basis as domestic investors
9
. Brokerage companies have capital 
requirements of LE 5 million (USD 656,200), and same-day trading on Egypt's Stock Exchange is 
                                                             
6 World Bank Group, Doing Business, Measuring Business Regulations. Retrieved 19 October, 2015 from  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/law-library/egypt. 
7
 U.S. Department of State, 2015. Egypt investment climate statement. Available from 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/227163.pdf 
8
 Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 22 June 
1992 (Egypt). See also Shahira Abel Shahid, Corporate Governance Is Becoming a Global Pursuit: What Can Be Done in Egypt? 42 (Sept. 
2001) (unpublished manuscript) http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=286875.  
9
 Ibid. 




© 2016 Pak Publishing Group. All Rights Reserved. 
allowed. As of January 2011, 47 brokerage companies had authorizations for same-day or intra-day 
trading. In addition, Law No. 123 of 2008 amended Law No. 95 of 1992 to allow local and foreign 
entities to issue bonds at a par value of LE 0.10 (USD 0.0131)
10
. 
Decree No. 719 of 2007 by the Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade and the Ministry of 
Finance affords privileges for industrial ventures in the governorates of Upper Egypt (Upper Egypt 
refers to the governors in southern Egypt). The decree provides a privilege of LE 15,000 (USD 
1,968) for each work opportunity created by the venture, on the clause that the investment costs of 
the venture overtake LE 15 million (USD 1.97 million)
11
. The decree can be processed on both new 
and current ventures. 
Law No.1 of 1998 (Maritime Law) allows private businesses, including foreign investors, to 
conduct most maritime conveyance activities, including loading, supplying, and vessel repair. Law 
17 of 1999 (Commercial Law) has more than 700 articles covering overall business, commercial 
agreements, banking contacts, commercial paper, and bankruptcy. Law No. 93 of 2000 (Central 
Depository Law) decreases risks related to trading safety, promotes market liquidity, and attempts 






, Egypt does not have a bankruptcy law per se; however, Law No. 17 of 
1999 (Commercial Law) enacts a chapter of bankruptcy. The terms of the bankruptcy chapter are 
worthless or vague on different key cases that are decisive to the decrease of settlement risks. 
Egypt's government has distinguished the absence of a functioning bankruptcy code as an 
important weakness for investment. In trying to help accelerate the bankruptcy process in 2015, the 
government amended Law No. 8 of 1997 (Investment Law), stipulating that if a firm under 
liquidation has not received a report of liquidation from the relevant administrative authorities 
within 120 days of the liquidating presenting the application, the firm will be liberated from its 
responsibilities. While this has accelerated bankruptcy proceedings to some extent, the government 
continues to show in public statements that efforts are underway to initiate new bankruptcy 
legislation to more permanently address continuing concerns over the cost and paperwork involved 
in the bankruptcy (Youssry and Partners, 2014).  
Lastly, in 2015, Egypt issued Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2015, amending much of the 
Egyptian investment-related legislation, including the General Sales Tax Law, the Companies Law, 
                                                             
10 Santander Trade Portal, Egypt: Foreign Investment. Retrieved 19 October, 2015 from https://en.santandertrade.com/establish-
overseas/egypt/foreign-investment 
11





 CDL was amended by laws 143/2004, 10/2009 and 127/2009. See also, Executive Regulations were amended by Decrees No. 227/2002, 
267/2002, 554/ 2002 and 193/2005. See also Listing Rules were amended by CMA Decision No. 94/2008 and EFSA Decisions No. 50/2009, 
64/2009, 67/2009 and 132/2010. 
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the Income Tax Law, and as the Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law. Egypt‟s one-stop shop 
system has been refined by the decree, which states that the Ministry of Investment‟s GAFI will 
serve as a liaison between investors and government agencies when applying for business licenses. 
The one-stop shop remains to be implemented. The decree offered non-tax incentives to investors 
in certain sectors or regions. The decree also offered new mechanisms for investment dispute 
settlement and improved corporate veil protection shielding senior executives from prosecution. 
Finally, the decree limits the expansion of free zones and gives the cabinet the exclusive right to 




3. EGYPTIAN FRAMEWORK IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT  
The structure of international trade and investment is one of the main frameworks that 
determine Egyptian policies. Current trade and investment agreements do not merely liberate 
pricing policies and abolish custom duties; they also become central cores of local economic 
policies that shift unfair terms and conditions of public policies, particularly concerning subsidies, 
investments, taxes, and industry. The following is one such case. The European Union, at the 
beginning of the so-called Arab Spring, began negotiating with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Jordan on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) (Hoekman and Djankov, 
1997) mainly focused on supporting foreign investors in the countries of the Arab Spring. 
The supporting of foreign investors will be through the amendments of policies and laws that 
govern over and control monopoly, competition, public procurement and investment guarantees in 
Egypt. Where, The Egyptian law does not apply to foreign investors in Egypt, overruling 
jurisdiction‟s powers of Egypt and passing the state of Egypt to address the dispute issues at the 
international investment courts Guzman (1998); Vandevelde (2000); Ginsburg (2005); Franck 
(2007).  
 
3.1. The Rule of Bilateral Investment Treaties  
BITs are accords that specify rules, terms, and conditions for organizing and controlling 
investment arrangements between two states
15
. It is significant to note that Egypt is constrained by 
many agreements with international investors and by safeguards, terms, and conditions set by 
international financial institutions (IFIs). All these can be regarded as a driving force behind 
Egypt‟s legislative amendments. Egypt is a binding party with over 100 states with bilateral 
                                                             
14
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development World Investment, Report (2013), Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development. P., 104. (2013). 
15
 Full list of Bilateral Investment Agreements concluded. (2013). Retrieved 12 October, 2015 from  
http___unctad_org_Sections_dite_pcbb_docs_bits_ egypt_pdf.  




© 2016 Pak Publishing Group. All Rights Reserved. 
investment treaties
16
. Most of these agreements contain clauses of legal technicality loopholes, 
triggering disputes that are settled through international arbitration panels such as the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) (Minas, 2008).  
Purportedly, Egypt has ratified to sign such agreements on the ground of serving the best 
strategies to encourage direct foreign investments (Cosmas, 2014). In fact, Egypt is not the only 
country to go for the investment policies; the African states had joined
17
 what is dubbed “the race 
to the bottom” where they compete to ease their investment climate to compete with other countries 
in attracting investors. They end up in a race to the bottom, without attracting the prospective 
investment. Therefore, it is not viable or realistic that most African countries such as Egypt 
automatically provide investors with all sorts of privileges
18
, without even looking into the added 
value of their investments. 
Therefore, neglecting calculations of potential risks rather than pursuing implementation of 
policies of attracting foreign investments by entering into BITs is no longer the case. Several 
developing countries, especially in Latin America and South Africa are beginning to revise BITs to 
seal off the legal loopholes, such as by removing unfair binding terms and conditions that are 
contrary to the public policy. 
The number of dispute cases of BITs rose up in the past few years‟ entails and indicates the 
failure of the WTO in negotiations in multilateral agreements on investment protections. To a great 
extent, the fiasco that was caused by the efforts of developing countries led to putting an end to 
such unfair treaties during WTO rounds of negotiations. These countries had felt the brunt of the 




The annual United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report showed 
that litigations in international investment courts witnessed an unprecedented surge in 2012, 
indicating that the huge rise was a result of BIT failures. The report disclosed that 68% of the 
countries affected by the arbitration were developing countries (Sanya, 2010). In response to the 
findings, UNCTAD also pointed out that investment rules linked to Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
“can hamper „the ability of governments to act for their people‟” (Subedi, 2012). This was the 
reality when protecting investments, no longer existed, instead of applying a means to attain 
                                                             
16
 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes _ICSID_ was the outcome of a multilateral treaty established by the 
Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development _IBRD_ of the World Bank_ The treaty was int roduced 
for signature on 18 March 1965 and entered into force on 14 October 1966. Retrieved from https___icsid_worldbank_org_ICSID_. 
17
 “Investment Minister: Amendment of investment initiative legislation is under review,” 26 July 2013. Retrieved 2014, from 
http://www.youm7.com/News. asp?NewsID=1178885#. Um5gIVynpAg.  
18
 The Department of Trade and Industry Republic of South Africa‟s Government Position Paper on Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy 
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economic development as part of a strategic plan freely drafted and scheduled by the state to boost 




3.2. The Unwarranted Restriction of International Framework 
Worth noting, Egypt is ranked as the first among Arab countries and as the fifth globally as 
the binding signatory state of total accords numbers of BITs with different countries. Updated data 
as given currently amount to 100 accords of BITs (Alcacer and Ingram, 2013). While these treaties 
are regarded as a tool for promoting economic growth and attracting investments, experience from 
different countries shows that these treaties pose a great threat to the democratic process and to the 
nation‟s economic and social policies (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006). To the foreign 
investors, the treaty is actually a de facto legal blanket for unconditional protection (Dolzer and 
Stevens, 1995).    
Noticeably, there are not clear provisions or legal definitions of corruption in the most of 
BITs. In addition, most, BITs do not include the rules of the states‟ rights to safeguard its public 
money and maintain its sovereignty. Therefore, without these provisions and rules, it is impossible 
to overrule the judgments of international arbitration courts that settle the disputes related to the 
corruption and public interest protection in BITs (Tony and Vaksha, 2011). An issue which is often 
raised in the objections of states and economists to BITs has been the broad and pliable definition 
of investors and investment. The majority of bilateral agreements does not entail a definition of 
these terms and therefore could be applied to a wide range of situations and cases. This means that 
arbitration courts looking into investment disputes, which only follow the rules of the BITs, are 
governed by the elastic definition
21
  
Remarkably, upon signing a treaty, the investors (of a signing party) already present in a 
country (with whom they state signed a BIT) and those who are yet to come, become protected 
under the terms of the treaty. In order to extend the blanket of protection, companies from countries 
without BITs with Egypt can seek the same protection by buying shares in a company in one of the 
BIT signatory countries or by opening a letter-box (ECES, 2013). Moreover, while the Egyptian 
investor has to abide by the Egyptian judicial laws, the foreign investor can simply choose to 
bypass the domestic courts of developing countries and even use the last resort of investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, which rule based on the terms of the BIT.  Let us refer to 
the case of Siag, the Egyptian business man who sued Egypt through international arbitration on 
the ground of his Italian citizenship; he received over LE 400 million as compensation from the 
Egyptian government. According to the Head of State Litigation Authority, the total value of 
compensation requested by investors who are suing Egypt in international court cases amounts to 
                                                             
20 Full list of Bilateral Investment Agreements concluded, 1 June 2013, Egypt. Retrieved 11 October, 2015 from 
http://unctad.org/Sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_egypt.pdf. 
21
 Corporate Europe Observatory, February, The Story of Dutch Letterbox which Could Cost Bolivia a Fortune” (2008). Retrieved 25 
November, 2015 from http archive_corporateeurope_org_bolivia_eti_html.  




© 2016 Pak Publishing Group. All Rights Reserved. 
almost LE 100 billion
22
.  From the foregoing, it has been illustrated that Egypt has committed to an 
international investment framework and that these obligations have been translated in the national 
legislative framework. 
 
4. THE EGYPTIAN LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS AND BYPASSING THE INHERITED 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Since this paper is on the impacts of the Egyptian legal system caused by the Egyptian 
investment, there is the need to analyze the application of the principles of rule of law in Egypt 
from the perspective of the existing Egyptian constitution. This concerns the relationship between 
the arms of the Egyptian government. That is, the judiciary, the legislature and the executive arms 
respectively. 
 
4.1. The Rule of Law 
The framework of the rule of law is derived from the United Nations
23
, a renowned 
international governing body that demonstrates the rule of law as a system in which the following 
four universal principles are upheld:  
(1) The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are 
accountable under the law.  
(2) The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect 
fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property.  
(3) The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair, 
and efficient.  
(4) Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and 
neutrals that are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of 
the communities they serve. 
In 2014, Egyptian legislators clearly addressed the rule of law in the Constitution, as follows: 
Judicial independence, Article 94: Rule of law  
“The rule of law is the foundation of governance in the state that is subject to the law.  
Nevertheless, the independence, immunity and impartiality of the judiciary are essential guarantees 
for the protection of rights and freedoms”
24
.  
Ultra vires administrative actions, Article 97: Right to litigate  
“Litigation is a safeguarded right and guaranteed to all. The state shall bring together the litigating 
parties, and work towards speedy judgment in cases. It is forbidden to grant any act or 
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administrative decision immunity from judicial oversight. Individuals may only be tried before 




4.2. The Judiciary in Egypt 
Principally, the Egyptian judicial authority is as the third independent power of the State. The 
Egyptian Judiciary is included tow sorts of courts religious and secular, administrative and non-
administrative courts, civil and commercial courts, a Supreme Constitutional Court, penal courts, 
personal status and family courts, labor courts, military courts, national security courts, also other 
kinds of courts or circuits. The system of Egyptian Courts is composed of three of tiers: The Courts 
of First Instance, Court of Appeal, and the Court of Cassation that is the top of the judiciary 
hierarchy. 
Judicial independence, Article 184: The judiciary  
“The judiciary is independent. It is vested in the courts of justice of different types and degrees in 
verdicts by issuing their judgments in accordance with the law. Its powers are defined by law. 
Interference in judicial affairs or in proceedings is a crime to trespassers on the authority of the 
judiciary no statute of limitations”
26
.  
Protection of judges' salaries, Article 185: Judicial bodies  
“All judicial bodies administer their own daily duties. Each of them has an independent budget, 
whose expenses items are all discussed by the House of Representatives. After approving each 
budget, it is incorporated in the state budget as a single figure, and their opinion is consulted 
closely based on the draft laws governing their affairs”
27
.  
The judiciary and public prosecution, Article 188: Mandate  
“The judiciary adjudicates all cases of disputes and crimes except for matters in which another 
judicial body is competent. Only the judiciary settles any dispute cases relating to the affairs of its 




Attorney general, Article 189: Public prosecution 
"Judicial Council is appointed members from among the Deputies to the President of the Court of 
Cassation, and the Presidents of the Court of Appeals or the Assistant Prosecutor Generals, by 
virtue of a presidential public prosecution as an integral part of the judiciary. The attorney general 
is responsible for investigating, pressing charges and prosecuting all criminal cases except what is 
exempted by the law that establishes for the public prosecution other competencies. Public 
prosecution is carried out by a Prosecutor General who is appointed by the Supreme Decree for a 
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period of four years, or for the remaining period until retirement age, whichever period comes first, 
and only once occurs during a judge‟s career”
29
. 
The State Council, Article 190: Mandate  
"The State Council is an independent judicial body that is exclusively competent to adjudicate in 
cases of administrative disputes, disciplinary and appeals as well as disputes pertaining to its 
decisions. It is also solely competent to publish opinions on the legal issues of judicial bodies to be 
determined by law. The mandate duties of the State Council are reviewing and drafting bills as well 
as finding resolutions of a legislative character, and reviewing of draft contracts to which the state 




4.3. Public Funds in Egyptian Law 
Public funds are dedicated and allocated to public interest. Therefore, these funds ought to be 
protected by special rules. The lawful protection of public funds from any abuse is compulsory to 
prevent any disruption to the public funds purpose
31
. In fact, the legislation of anti-abuse public 
funds is popular in various countries worldwide, especially the protection of public funds being 
permeated for the sake of society. After all, the protection and maintenance of the sustainable 
operation of public utilities were covered by the civil law, the Penal Code and even those legal 
clauses in the central core of the Constitution. 
 
A- Constitutional Protection 
The consecutive Egyptian constitutions have frequently established legal protection of public 
funds. The chronicled findings are listed below: 
1. The 1956 Constitution stipulated in Article 27, “Public ownership shall have its 
sanctity, and its protection and consolidation is the duty of every citizen."  
2. The 1962 Constitution stipulated in Article 15, "Public ownership shall have its 
sanctity; and that its protection and consolidation are the duty of every citizen in 
accordance with the law, because the Article 15 is considered as the groundwork   of 
the strength of the homeland, a basis for the socialist system and a source of prosperity 
for the people."  
3. In addition to this context, the 1971 Constitution developed Article 29, which 
stipulates, "Ownership shall be under the supervision of the people and the protection 
of the State. There are three kinds of ownership: public ownership, cooperative 
ownership and private ownership”
32
. 
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4. The constitutional amendments of 2007 tried to reverse to the new capitalist trend of 
the state. Article 33 of the constitutional amendments of 2007 nullified Article 15 of 
the 1962 constitutional amendments. 
5. The last constitutional amendments in 2014 emphasized protection of the public funds 
in "Article 32: Natural resources, “which stated, “Natural resources belong to the 
people. The state commits to preserving such resources, to their sound exploitation, to 
preventing their depletion, and to take into consideration the rights of future 
generations to execute sustainable development"
33
. 
6. The following additional amended clauses were added to "Article 33: Ownership” by 
ceding, “The state protects ownership, which encompasses three types: Public 
ownership, private ownership, and cooperative ownership,"
34
 and to "Article 34: Public 
Property" by quoting "Public property is inviolable and may not be infringed upon. It is 




B- Legal Texts of Public Funds 
The Egyptian legislation includes several legal texts that incriminate the assault, seizure or 
abuse of public funds, whether in the Egyptian constitution or in executive laws and regulations. 
Egypt had joined the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2004, a year after it was 
developed; and it went into force; was ratified and published in the official journal on 08/2/2007
36
.   
The Egyptian legislature devoted sections three and four of the Egyptian Penal Code to public 
funds abuse crimes. The third section tackled bribery and the crimes associated with it, while the 
fourth section tackled public funds embezzlement. The Egyptian legislature considers any public 
official who asks for or accepts gifts or promises in order to perform or to not perform his job or as 
a reward for what he has done is a bribe taker, even if he did not mean to perform or not to perform 
this task and if there wasn't a prior agreement. The legislature enacted penalties of up to life 
sentence for both the briber and the bribe taker. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian legislature incriminated the seizure and unjust enrichment off public 
funds or facilitating it for others, as well as the deliberate or non-deliberate actions that might abuse 
public funds as long as they harmed public funds. Regarding the right to file reports of incidents of 
public fund‟s abuse, the Criminal Procedures Law allowed citizens and obliged public officials 
who acknowledge a crime to report it to the competent authorities. Article (25) of the Criminal 
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Procedures Law stipulates that for anyone who acknowledges a crime, the Public Prosecution can 
file a lawsuit about it without a complaint or request, provided that he informs the Public 
Prosecution or one of the law enforcement officers. Article (26) stipulates that any public (services) 
official who acknowledges a crime, which the Public Prosecution can file a lawsuit about without a 
complaint or request, while or because of performing his/her job, has to report it to the nearest 
prosecutor or law enforcement officer.  
In addition to the abovementioned penal codes and procedural legislations, the below relevant 
laws apply to public servants who dare to breach public servant and administration codes for 
managing, disposing of, or illegally using public funds, even if their commitments do not intend to 
waste the public funds: 
- Auctions and Tenders Law No. 89/1998 and its executive bylaw 
- Public Budgeting Law No. 53/1973 
- Civil State Employees Law No. 47/1978 
 
4.4. Amendments of Decrees and Abuse 
Consecutive Egyptian governments amended the investment code several times after the 
outbreak of the Revolution in 2011. Probably the strong debates and adoption of the new 
“Legislative Package to Stimulate Investment” on the eve of the economic conference on 12/3/2015 
were the most popular legal issues in the reform of the investment regime. Regardless, the 
“Package” consists of two presidential decrees: 
 The first is the Decree of Law No. 16 of 2015, which amended some provisions of the 
Criminal Procedures Law, issued by Law No. 150 of 1950. The second is the Decree of Law No. 
17 of 2015, which amended some provisions of the Law No. 159 of 1981, regulating joint stock 
companies, private equity firms and limited liability companies; the General Sales Tax Law No. 11 
of 1991; the Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law No. 8 of 1997; and the Income Tax Law 
No. 91 of 2005. 
The “Legislative Package to Stimulate Investment” and several amendments were considered 
necessary to reassure the foreign investors in Egypt. Most notably, the amendments set a standard 
for the settlement of investment disputes, keeping away from the court system in Egypt. Article 7 
of Presidential Decree No. 17 for the year 2015 stipulated that investment disputes could be settled 
as the contract specified and according to the provision of this law. In particular, Articles 101, 104, 
and 108 of paragraph Sections Seven of the latter legislative reform provided for the creation of 
three committees: first, the Committee for Investment Complaints; second, the Ministerial 
Committee for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and third, the Ministerial Committee for the 
Settlement of Investment Contracts‟ Disputes. The decisions of these committees would be taken 
into effect by executing the decrees once they were ratified by the cabinet (article 110). 
The setup of the ministerial committees was carried out within the cabinet that laid down 
qualified conditions for the membership of one of the representatives of the State Council 
president; the rest of the members were ministers or representatives of ministers. However, the 
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“Ministerial Committee for the Settlement of Investment Contracts‟ Disputes” laid down resolution 
conditions for the acceptance of the settlement that was provided by the committee and all binding 
parties of the contract. It was subsequently ratified by the cabinet (Article 110), and then it became 
enforceable. 
Legal experts may be aware that Article 110 came to threaten the inability to enforce the final 
provisions of the Administrative High Court, such as the invalidity of the privatization of a number 
of public sector companies as the reference case. This occurrence was due to changing the status of 
these firms and their properties, but also that they faced to acquire a new reality. On the other hand, 
the usual practices were that this written document turned out to be a way of circumventing the 
final judgments. Thus, article 110 would rather apply to re-allocating the investment projects and 
land for the same investors, according to the rules of Usufruct, and not according to the Egyptian 
law of Bids and Tenders. Noticeably, under the usufruct system, land is offered to investors for 
periods ranging from 40 to 100 years in exchange for annual fees, while ownership of the land 
remains with the state.  Furthermore, the courts were representative of the people dealing with 
administration of litigation for handling disputes, but were also given verdicts to the violators. This 
was mentioned in the last Egyptian Constitution in articles (188, 189, and 190)
37
. The settlements 
were regarded as the most constitutional amendments in the world. 
In 2015, the articles providing for dispute settlement through ministerial committees were 
accompanied by legislative amendments to the Criminal Procedures Act through the Decree of Law 
No. 16. In particular, (Article 18, bis, B) of the subsequent legislative reform stipulated the 
permissibility of reconciliation in the crimes that were listed in chapter four of Book tow of the 
Criminal Procedures Act, titled “Defalcation of, Encroachment on and Embezzlement of Public 
Funds,” and further provision for “the consequent expiry of the criminal case” once the enforceable 
reconciliation was ratified by the cabinet. This significant change in dispute settlement was put 
through in Egypt: Despite that, the previous existence of dispute settlement in committees, keeping 
away from the court system, was limited to administrative breaches and offenses penalized by fines 
only (Article 18 of the Criminal Procedures Act). 
The official permission for reconciliation and dispute settlement for more serious corruption 
crimes ended up with previously punishment by prison terms (including life in prison terms for 
several crimes that are listed in chapter four of   Book tow of the Criminal Procedures Act) was a 
transgression in Egypt‟s criminal justice system and articulated a new perception – mainly 
propagated by the government of Egypt in the past few years almost 10 years – that corruption and 
embezzlement of public funds were minor offenses but not crimes. 
It is noteworthy to mention that the government of Egypt propagated the new law as an anti-
corruption legislation. In particular, (Article 10, bis,1) of Decree of Law No. 17 in 2015 pointed out 
that investments built on deceit and corruption would not enjoy the protections, incentives, or 
guarantees given by the reform package, provided that the corruption and deceit were proven by a 
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court order from the specialized courts. This article was enigmatic in multiply ways. Firstly, it was 
not clear how court orders would be issued to deal with investments and contracts if courts almost 
entirely lost jurisdiction‟s power over the business conduct of the state with investors. Secondly, 
behind the background of Law No. 32 in 2014, it was not clear how corruption would be exposed if 
third parties were not allowed to challenge state-investor contracts and investment deals. Thirdly, 
there was a possibility that the Minister of Investment, who became the sole authority for 
challenging corruption, would litigate and investigate corrupt investments, resulting in court orders. 
Indeed, this in turn transferred into the futility of this so-called anti-corruption clause. Finally, the 
Reform Package annulled the tender and bid system for the disposition of state-owned land and 
property for the purposes of investment. Such legal measurement marked a turning point of 
reversing the state policy on land/property, sale, rent, and disposition of public property (Section 5, 
Articles 71 and 72). The state (after the approval of the cabinet) was also allowed to disperse lands 
and property to investors in specific geographical areas (complying fully with presidential decree) 
free of charge, for a period of five years (taking effect on April 2015). Additionally, the articles in 
the same paragraph section left a wide discretion to the committees that were formed by the 
Investment Authority in the selling, renting, or temporary disposition of lands and property for 
investment purposes, including vague provisions for the price setting of these properties (see 
Article 80) and generous exemptions from the land and property prices, especially when the state 
initiated an idea for an investment project to be carried out by private investors (see Article79). 
Previously, the investment package was accompanied by guaranteed tax breaks to investors in 
Egypt, when the tax rate was sliced from 30% on corporate income and personal income above 1 
million EGP to a flat rate of 22.5%
38
. Taxation imposed on the Central Bank of Egypt, the Suez 
Canal Company, and the General Petroleum Corporation remained at a rate of 40.5%, whereas 
petroleum excavation companies continued to undergo the same tax rate of 40% on profits. A new 
10% tax on profits was incurred from selling the company‟s shares exceeding 33% of the 
company‟s total shares [86] by offering unprecedented terms of taxing capital gains.  
As per the tax exemptions under Egyptian law, Article No. 50 of Law No. 91 in 2005 dealing 
with income tax law exempted taxes on profits for companies reclaiming and farming lands for a 
period of 10 years. The same exemption was applied to profits of companies in poultry production, 
beekeeping, fisheries, fish farms, and livestock barns. Article 20 in Investment Law No. 8 in 1997 
exempted contracts needed for the establishment of companies and facilities including the loan and 
mortgage contracts related to the establishment of companies, as well as the land-registering 
contracts necessary for establishing the companies and facilities are free  from the tax of the stamp 
duty for a period of five years from the date of registration in the Commercial Register Bureau, as 
well as based on the date of documentation and notarization fees. 
While Egypt enjoyed exercising territorial jurisdiction‟s power over any activity occurring 
within its borders, this sovereignty and jurisdiction did not extend to violations that were 
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committed by international organizations or foreign investors. This was a result of two main 
variables. Firstly, as previously mentioned, Egypt had a weak legislative framework in dealing with 
such violations – particularly after the amendments of the laws referred to in earlier periods. 
Secondly, the policy and ideology of Egyptian economic strategy depended totally on the income 
from FDI inflow. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the foregoing that this paper has analyzed the significant impact of the 
Egyptian legal system caused by the Egyptian investment legislation. The Egyptian investment 
legislation provided favorable conditions for foreign investors at the expense of the public interest 
which is protected by the Egyptian constitution. The paper has also revealed that there is usurpation 
of the Egyptian courts to hear and determine investment related disputes through the 
instrumentality of BITs. All these seem to violate the extant laws of Egypt as a sovereign country. 
The paper therefore recommends the amendment of the Constitution to prevent giving free hand to 
foreign investors at the expense of the public interest. Secondly, it also recommends training of the 
judicial officers in the area high technology and the current trend in the international investment 
laws.  Thirdly, the paper recommends establishment of special courts to handle the foreign 
investor‟s disputes and related matters.   Finally the paper recommends the introduction of new 
economic policies to attract foreign investment that would not comprise the interest of the Egyptian 
government and its populace. 
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